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Aggregation theory and the relevance of some issues to
others
Franz Dietrich
December 2006
Abstract. I propose a general collective decision problem consisting in many issues
that are interconnected in two ways: by mutual constraints and by connections of
relevance. Aggregate decisions should respect the mutual constraints, and be based
on relevant information only. This general informational constraint has many special
cases, including premise-basedness and Arrows independence condition; they result
from special notions of relevance. The existence and nature of (non-degenerate)
aggregation rules depends on both types of connections. One result, if applied to the
preference aggregation problem and adopting Arrows notion of (ir)relevance, becomes
Arrows Theorem, without excluding indi¤erences unlike in earlier generalisations.
Keywords: aggregation, informational constraints, (ir)relevance, premise-based pro-
cedure
JEL Classication Numbers: D70, D71
1 Introduction
Most complex decision problems can be formalised as consisting of many binary de-
cisions: decisions of accepting or rejecting certain propositions. For instance, estab-
lishing a preference relation R over a given set of alternatives Q consists in deciding,
for each pair of alternatives x; y 2 Q, whether or not xRy. Judging the values of
di¤erent variables consists of judging, for each variable V and each of its potential
values v, whether or not V = v. Producing a report that contains qualitative eco-
nomic forecasts might involve deciding for or against many propositions: atomic ones
like "ination will increase" and compound ones like "if consumption will increase
and foreign demand does not decrease, then ination will increase" (where logical
operators are italicised).
Although this division into binary issues is usually possible, there are arguably
two distinct types of interconnections to be called logical connections and relevance
connections that can prevent us from treating the issues independently. First, the
decisions on the issues may logically constrain each other; in the above examples, the
preference judgments must respect conditions like transitivity, the variables might
constrain each other, and the propositions stated in the economic report must be
logically consistent with each other, respectively. Second and this is the topic of the
paper some issues may be relevant to (the decision on) other issues. The nature and
interpretation of relevance connections is context-specic. A proposition r may be
relevant to another one p on the grounds that r is an (argumentative) premise of p, or
that r is a causal factor bringing about p, or that r and p share some other (semantic)
relation. Relevance connections are not reducible to logical connections. Two issues
say, whether tra¢ c lights are necessary and whether the diplomatic relations to a
country should be interrupted may be considered irrelevant to each other and yet
be indirectly logically related via other issues under consideration. Conversely, an
issue  say that of whether country X has weapons of mass destruction may be
considered relevant to another issue say that of whether measure Y against country
X is appropriate without a (direct or indirect) logical connection in the complex
decision problem considered.
Now suppose that the complex decision problem is faced by a group of individuals
and should be settled by aggregating the individual judgments on each proposition
(issue). Many concrete aggregation models and procedures in the literature in e¤ect
account, in di¤erent ways, both for logical connections and relevance connections.
Logical connections are represented by delimiting the set of admissible decisions, for
instance in the form of rationality conditions like transitivity in preference aggrega-
tion, or in the form of an overall budget constraint if di¤erent budget items are decided
simultaneously. By contrast, relevance connections are accounted for through "infor-
mational" constraints on the way in which the decision (output of the aggregation
rule) may depend on the individualsinput: only relevant information may be used.
For instance, Arrows condition of independence of irrelevant alternatives ("IIA")
excludes the use of (arguably) irrelevant information. The premise-based procedure
in judgment aggregation makes the decision on certain conclusion-type propositions
dependent on peoples judgments on other premise-type propositions considered rel-
evant. In general, the question of "what is relevant to what?" may be controversial:
some researchers reject Arrows IIA condition, and in judgment aggregation it may
be unclear which propositions to consider as premises and which as conclusions, and
moreover the same conclusion-type proposition could be explained in more than one
way in terms of premises.
While accounted for in concrete aggregation problems and procedures, the notions
of relevance and of (ir)relevant information have not been treated in general terms.
As relevance connections are not reducible to logical connections, both connections
should be separate ingredients of a general aggregation model. More precisely, I
propose to consider, in addition to logical connections, a (binary) relevance relation
R between propositions (issues), and to aggregate in accordance with independence of
irrelevant information ("III"). To allow broad applications, I leave general the type
of complex decision problem and the interpretation and relation-theoretic properties
of the relevance relation R: it might be highly partial (few inter-relevances) or close
to complete (many inter-relevances), and it need not be symmetric, or transitive, or
reexive (i.e. self-irrelevance is allowed).
In the special case that every proposition is considered relevant just to itself
(i.e. pRq , p = q for any propositions p; q), III reduces to the restrictive condi-
tion of proposition-wise independence (often simply called independence): here, each
proposition is decided via an isolated vote, using an arbitrary voting rule but ig-
noring peoples judgments on other propositions. A number of general results have
been obtained on proposition-wise independent aggregation, in abstract aggregation
models (starting with Wilson 1975) or models of logic-based judgment aggregation
(starting with List and Pettit 2002). Essentially, these results establish limits to
the possibility of (non-degenerate) proposition-wise independent aggregation in the
presence of logical connections between propositions. Impossibility results with nec-
essary conditions on logical connections are derived, for instance, by Wilson (1975),
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List and Pettit (2002), Pauly and van Hees (2006), Dietrich (2006), Gärdenfors
(2006), Mongin (2005-a) and van Hees (forthcoming). Nehring and Puppe (2002,
2005, 2006) derive the rst results with minimal conditions on logical connections,
and Dokow and Holzman (2005) introduce minimal conditions of an algebraic kind.
Other (im)possibility results are given, for instance, in Dietrich (forthcoming), Di-
etrich and List (forthcoming-a, forthcoming-b) and Nehring (2005). Possibilities of
proposition-wise independent aggregation arise if the individual judgments fall into
particular domains (List 2003, Dietrich and List 2006) or if logical connections are
modelled using subjunctive implications (Dietrich 2005).
The proposition-wise independence condition is often criticised (e.g., Chapman
2002, Mongin 2005-a), but has rarely been weakened in the general aggregation liter-
ature. The normative appeal of the condition is easily challenged by concrete exam-
ples: why, for instance, should the collective judgment on whether to introduce taxes
on kerosene be independent of peoples judgments on whether global warming should
be prevented? All weaker independence conditions proposed in the literature are spe-
cial cases of III: each implicitly uses some notion of relevance R. Let me mention the
literatures two most notable independence weakenings.1
One departure from proposition-wise independence aims to represent non-binary
variables.2 Suppose again the decision problem consists in estimating the values of
di¤erent typically non-binary (interconnected) variables V like GDP growth. Then
propositions take the form V = v, where V is a variable and v belongs to a set
Rge(V ) of possible values of V . Suppose the collective estimate of each variable V
must be a function of peoples estimates of V (e.g. a weighted average). Then the
collective judgment on whether V = v depends on peoples attitudes towards the
propositions V = v0; v0 2 Rge(V ) (each individual accepts exactly one of them).3 So
aggregation is variable-wise independent  not proposition-wise as the decision on
whether V = v depends not just on peoples views on whether V = v. Variable-wise
independence is an example of III, where any V = v and V = v0 are now inter-relevant.
Variable-wise independence is often imposed: for instance in probability aggregation
theory, where a variable is an events probability and variable-wise independence leads
(under other constraints) to linear aggregation rules (e.g. Genest and Zidek 1986);
or in abstract aggregation theory, where Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) derive more
general linearity results on variable-wise independent aggregation; or in judgment
aggregation, where Claussen and Roisland (2005) introduce a variable-wise version of
the discursive paradox and show results on when it occurs. Also Pauly and van Hees
(2006) multi-valued logic approach can be viewed as using variable-wise independence.
A second weakening of proposition-wise independence aims to represent the dif-
ferent status of di¤erent propositions. Here the independence condition is applied
1A more radical move consists in imposing no independence condition (informational constraint)
on aggregation. This route is taken in the literature on belief merging in articial intelligence (e.g.
Konieczni and Pino-Perez 2002, Eckert and Pigozzi 2005). Apart from the absence of informational
constraints, belief merging is closely related to judgment aggregation: it also aims to merge sets of
logical propositions.
2 It was originally not intended as a weakening of proposition-wise independence, but is one under
our division of the decision problem into (binary) decisions on propositions of the form V = v; v 2
Rge(V ).
3E.g. the collective accepts V = v if and only if v is a certain weighted average of the individual
estimates v0 of V , i.e. of the values v0 2 Rge(V ) for which V = v0 is accepted.
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only to some propositions, e.g. to "premises" (Dietrich 2006) or to atomic propo-
sitions (Mongin 2005-a). Mongin (2005-a) argues that the collective judgment on a
compound proposition like p ^ q should not ignore how the individuals judge p and
judge q; our relevance relation R would then have to satisfy pR(p^ q) and qR(p^ q).
This paper has an expository and a technical focus. On the expository dimension,
I introduce the relevance-based aggregation model; I discuss di¤erent types of rele-
vance relations, including transitive relevance, asymmetric relevance, and relevance
as premisehood; I introduce relevance-based conditions of III, agreement preservation
and dictatorship (generalising for instance Arrows conditions of IIA, weak Pareto
and weak dictatorship); and I introduce signicantly generalised forms of premise-
based and prioritarian aggregation rules. On the technical dimension, I prove two
possibility and four impossibility results on III aggregation. One result, if applied
to the preference aggregation problem, becomes Arrows Theorem. While Arrows
Theorem has been generalised earlier under the simplifying assumption that not only
individuals but also the collective are never indi¤erent between distinct options,4 one
might view as an embarrassment of the growing literature that, despite its intended
generality, its theorems do not generalise Arrows (unrestricted) theorem; and its
aggregation conditions do not have as special cases Arrows conditions of IIA, weak
Pereto and weak dictatorship.
2 Basic denitions
We consider a set N = f1; :::; ng of individuals, where n  2, faced with a collective
decision problem of a general kind.
Agenda, judgment sets. The agenda is an arbitrary non-empty (possibly innite) set
X of propositions on which a decision (acceptance or rejection) is needed. The agenda
includes negated propositions: X = fp;:p : p 2 X+g, where X+ is some set of non-
negated propositions and ":p" stands for "not p". Notationally, double-negations
cancel each other out.5 A judgment set is a set A  X of (accepted) propositions; it
is complete if it contains a member of each pair p;:p 2 X ("no abstentions").
Logical interconnections. Not all judgment sets are consistent. For the agenda X =
fa;:a; b;:b; a^b;:(a^b)g, the (complete) judgment set fa; b;:(a^b)g is inconsistent.
Let J be a non-empty set of judgment sets, each containing exactly one member of
each pair p;:p 2 X, and suppose the consistent judgment sets are precisely the sets
in J and their subsets; all other judgment sets are inconsistent.6 A judgment set
A  X entails a proposition p 2 X (written A ` p) if A [ f:pg is inconsistent. I
write q ` p for fqg ` p.
It is natural (though for the present results not necessary) to take the propositions
in X to be statements of a formal language, and to take consistency/entailment to
4See Wilson (1975), Dietrich and List (forthcoming-b), and Dokow and Holzman (2005). Nehring
(2003) shows an Arrow-like result.
5That is: whenever I write ":q" (where q 2 X), I mean the other member of the pair p;:p 2 X
to which q belongs; hence "::q" stands for q.
6So J contains the consistent and complete judgment sets. Any set fp;:pg  X is inconsistent.
Any subset of a consistent set is consistent. Finally, ; is consistent, and any consistent set has a
superset that is consistent and complete (hence in J ).
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be standard logical consistency/entailment, as is usually assumed in the judgment
aggregation literature. The formal language, if su¢ ciently expressive, can mimic the
natural language in which the real decision problem arises.7
A proposition p 2 X is a contradiction if fpg is inconsistent, and a tautology if
f:pg is inconsistent. I call A  X consistent with B  X if A [B is consistent; and
I call A  X consistent with p 2 X (and p consistent with A) if A[fpg is consistent.
Aggregation. The (judgment) aggregation rule is a function F that assigns to every
prole (A1; : : : ; An) of (individual) judgment sets in some domain of "admissible"
proles a (collective) judgment set F (A1; : : : ; An) = A  X. It is often required
that F has universal domain, i.e. allows as an input precisely all proles (A1; :::; An)
of consistent and complete (individual) judgment sets. An important question is
how rational the (collective) judgment sets generated by F are: are they consistent?
Complete? If F has universal domain and consistent and complete outputs, it is a
function F : J n ! J . Majority rule on J n, given by
F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : jfi : p 2 Aigj > n=2g for all (A1; :::; An) 2 J n,
may for most agendas generate inconsistent outputs: it is not a function F : J n ! J .
Abstract aggregation. One may (re)interpret the elements of X as arbitrary attributes,
which may but need not be propositions/judgments, and may but need not be ex-
pressed in formal logic. Then judgment sets become attribute sets, and the aggrega-
tion rule maps proles of individual attribute sets to a collective attribute set. Of
course, the attribute holders i 2 N need not be humans.
I give two examples here; more examples follow in the next section.
Example 1: preference aggregation. For a given set of (exclusive) alternatives
Q (jQj  3), consider the agenda
X := fxRy;:xRy : x; y 2 Qg (the preference agenda),
where xRy is the proposition "x is at least as good as y". Throughout the paper,
I often write xPy for :yRx. Let J be the set of all judgment sets A  X that
represent fully rational preferences, i.e. for which there exists a weak ordering8  on
Q such that
A = fxRy 2 X : x  yg [ f:xRy 2 X : x 6 yg.
Note that there is a bijective correspondence between weak orderings on Q and judg-
ment sets in J ; and between judgment aggregation rules F : J n ! J and Arrowian
social welfare functions (with universal domain). The agenda X and its consistency
7The formal language can be one of classical (propositional or predicate) logic or one of a non-
classical logic such as a modal logic, as long as the logic satises certain regularity conditions. This
follows Dietrichs (forthcoming) model of judgment aggregation in general logics, which generalises
List and Pettits (2002) original model in classical propositional logic.
8A weak ordering on Q is a binary relation  on Q that is reexive, transitive, and connected
(but not necessarily anti-symmetric, so that non-trivial indi¤erences are allowed).
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notion belong to a predicate logic, as dened in Dietrich (forthcoming), drawing on
List and Pettit (2004).9
Example 2: judging values of and constraints between variables. Suppose a
group (e.g. a central banks board or research panel) debates the values of di¤erent
variables (e.g. macroeconomic variables measuring GDP, prices or consumption).
Let V be a non-empty set of "variables". For each V 2 V let Rge(V ) be a non-
empty set of possible "values" of V (numbers or other objects), called the range of
V . For any variable V 2 V and any value v 2 Rge(V ), the group has to judge
the proposition V = v stating that V takes the value v.10 These judgments should
respects the (causal) constraints between variables; but, not surprisingly, the nature
of these constraints is itself disputed, for instance because the group members believe
in di¤erent (e.g. econometric) estimation techniques. If the variables are real-valued,
some linear constraints like V +3W  U = 5, or non-linear ones like V 2 =W , might
be debated. Let C be any non-empty set of "constraints" under consideration.11 The
agenda is given by
X = fV = v;:(V = v) : V 2 V; v 2 Rge(V )g [ fc;:c : c 2 Cg.
A judgment set A  X thus states that certain variables do (not) take certain values,
and that the variables do (not) constrain each other in certain ways. To dene logical
connections, note rst that some constraints may conict with others (e.g., V > W
conicts with W > V ), and that some constraints may conict with other negated
constraints (e.g., V log(W ) > 2 conicts with :(V log(W ) > 0)). Let J  be some
non-empty set containing for each constraint c 2 C either c or :c (not both); the sets
in J  represent consistent judgments on the constraints. Now let J be the set of all
judgment sets A  X containing exactly one member of each pair p;:p 2 X such
that:12
(i) each variable V 2 V has a single value v 2 Rge(V ) with V = v 2 A;
(ii) the family of values in (i) obeys all accepted constraints c 2 A \C;
(iii) the judgments on constraints are consistent: A \ fc;:c : c 2 Cg 2 J .
Note that it may be consistent to hold a negated constraint :c and yet to as-
sign values to variables in accordance with c. Indeed, variables can stand in certain
relations by pure coincidence, i.e. without a constraint to this e¤ect.13
9See Dietrich and List (forthcoming-b) for a logic representing strict preference aggregation.
10More generally, the group might consider propositions stating that V s value belongs to certain
sets S  val(V ):
11A constraint might be formalised by a subset of the "joint range" V 2VRge(V ) of the family of
variables (V )V 2V (e.g. a subset of R3 if V consists of three real-valued variables), or by an expression
in a logical language (see below).
12 It is easily possible to add exogenous constraints (which cannot be rejected, unlike those in C),
by further restricting in (iii) the allowed value assignments.
13More precisely, a constraint states not just an actual relation r between variables but a necessary
relation "necessarily r", that is (in modal logical terms) "in all possible worlds r" (r). The negation
of this constraint (:r) is equivalent to "possibly :r" (:r), which is indeed consistent with "r",
i.e. with the relation holding.
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3 Independence of irrelevant information
The conditions I will impose on the aggregation rule are based on a relevance rela-
tion, whose nature and interpretation is context-specic, as indicated earlier. Such a
relevance relation is not simply reducible to logical interconnections (of inconsistency
or entailment). Suppose the proposition a : "country X has weapons of mass de-
struction" (and :a) is considered relevant to the proposition b: "country X should be
attacked" (and to :b), but not vice versa. This asymmetry of relevance between the
two issues need not be reected in logical connections: J can be perfectly symmetric
in the two issues. This is clear if X contains no issues other than these two (logically
independent) ones, i.e. if X = fa;:a; b;:bg. But even additional propositions in X
that create (indirect) logical links between the two issues need not reveal a direction
of relevance, as is seen from examples.14 Hence any relevance relation derived from
logical interconnections would have to declare, against our intuition, the two issues
as either mutually relevant or mutually irrelevant.
So relevance must be taken on board as an additional structure. I do this in the
form of a relevance relation. Not any binary relation on X can reasonably count as
a relevance relation. I call a binary relation R on the agenda X a relevance relation
(where "rRp" means "r is relevant to p") if the following condition holds.
No underdetermination. Each p 2 X is settled by the judgments on the relevant
propositions: for every consistent set E  fr;:r : rRpg containing a member of
each pair r;:r in fr;:r : rRpg, either E ` p or E ` :p. (I call such an E an
(R-)explanation of p or (R-)refutation of p, respectively.)
This denition of a relevance relation has two main characteristics.
First, it requires no relation-theoretic properties like reexivity or symmetry. This
generality is essential to represent di¤erent notions of relevance (see below); and it
is appropriate since no relation-theoretic property is uncontroversially adequate for
all decision problems. Below I suggest relation-theoretic conditions on relevance for
special decision problems, but di¤erent ones across decision problems.
Second, it requires "no underdetermination": a propositions truth value must be
fully determined by the relevant propositionstruth values. To illustrate this condition
(which I justify in the next section), note rst that it holds trivially for self-relevant
propositions p 2 X, as ps truth value settles ps truth value; here all explanations
of p contain p, and all refutations of p contain :p.15 In particular, all reexive
relations R satisfy "no underdetermination", i.e. are relevance relations. This said,
"no underdetermination" is a weak condition. It only has a bite for propositions
that are non-self-relevant, hence "externally" explained. For instance, suppose to a
14Suppose X = fa;:a; a ! b;:(a ! b); b;:bg. The symmetry argument is simple. A truth-value
assignment (t1; t2; t3) 2 fT; Fg3 to the propositions a; a! b;:b is consistent if and only if (t3; t2; t1)
(in which the truth-values of a and :b are interchanged) is consistent. This is so whether a ! b
represents a subjunctive or a material implication. In the rst case, the only inconsistent truth-value
assignment is (T; T; T ). In the second case, there are other inconsistent truth-value assignments (as
a! b is equivalent to :a _ b), yet without breaking the symmetry between a and :b.
15 If p is the only proposition relevant to p, ps only explanation is fpg (except if p is a contradiction:
then p has no explanation), and ps only refutation is f:pg (except if :p is a contradiction: then p
has no refutation).
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conjunction a ^ b only the conjuncts a and b, not a ^ b itself, are deemed relevant.
(Such an idea underlies the premise-based procedure for the agenda given by X+ =
fa; b; a ^ bg; see Example 4 below.) Here, a ^ bs truth value is indeed determined
by as and bs truth values; a ^ b has a single explanation (fa; bg) and three possible
refutations (f:a; bg, fa;:bg, f:a;:bg). Dropping as or bs relevance to a ^ b would
lead to underdetermination.
Hereafter, let R be a given relevance relation. I denote the set of propositions
relevant to p 2 X by R(p) := fr 2 X : rRpg. The following condition requires the
collective judgment on any proposition p 2 X to be formed on the basis of how the
individuals judge the propositions relevant to p.
Independence of Irrelevant Information (III). For all propositions p 2 X and
all proles (A1; :::; An) and (A01; :::; A0n) in the domain, if Ai \ R(p) = A0i \ R(p) for
every individual i then p 2 F (A1; :::; An), p 2 F (A01; :::; A0n).
Many informational constraints on aggregation used in social choice theory can be
viewed as being the III condition relative to some notion of relevance. Roughly, the
more propositions are relevant to each other, the weaker the informational constraint
III is. III is empty if all propositions are relevant to all propositions, i.e. ifR = XX.
III is the standard proposition-wise independence condition if each proposition is just
self-relevant, i.e. R(p) = fpg for all p 2 X. III is Gärdenfors "weak" (yet still
quite strong) independence if R(p) = fp;:pg for all p 2 X. III is Dietrichs (2006)
independence restricted to a subset Y  X if R(p) = fpg for p 2 Y and R(p) = X for
p 2 XnY . III is Mongins (2005-a) independence restricted to the atomic propositions
(of an agendaX in a propositional language) ifR(p) = fpg for atomic p andR(p) = X
for compound p (e.g. p = a ^ :b).
I now discuss further examples of relevance relations. These examples make the
convenient assumption that relevance is negation-invariant :16
pRq , ~pR~q for all p; q 2 X and all ~p 2 fp;:pg, ~q 2 fq;:qg (negation invariance).
So R is determined by its restriction to the set X+  X of non-negated propositions.
Let R+ be this restriction, and for all p 2 X+ let R+(p) := R(p)\X+ (= fr 2 X+ :
rRpg = fr 2 X+ : rR+pg).
Example 1 (continued). For the preference agenda, III is equivalent to Arrows
independence of irrelevant alternatives ("IIA") in virtue of dening relevance by
R+(xRy) := fxRy; yRxg for all xRy 2 X. (1)
I call this the Arrowian relevance relation. Indeed, to socially decide on xRy, Ar-
row considers as relevant whether people weakly prefer x to y and also whether they
weakly prefer y to x. By contrast, the standard proposition-wise independence con-
dition is stronger than IIA, as it denies the relevance of yRx to xRy.
16The relevance relation underlying proposition-wise independence (given by R(p) = fpg for all
p 2 X) is not negation-invariant.
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Example 2 (continued). For the agenda of Example 2, one might put
R+(V = v) = fV = v0 : v0 2 Rge(V )g for all V = v 2 X
R+(c) = fcg for all constraints c 2 C. (2)
On a modied assumption, some distinct constraints c; c0 2 C might be declared
inter-relevant, for instance if they involve the same variables.
Example 3: relevance as an equivalence relation, and topic-wise indepen-
dence. Examples 1 and 2 are instances of the general case where relevance is an
equivalence relation: R is reexive (which requires self-relevance), symmetric, and
transitive. Each of these three conditions is a substantial assumption on the no-
tion of relevance. The agenda X is then partitioned into equivalence classes (of
inter-relevant propositions), each one interpretable as a topic; so III is a topic-wise
(rather than proposition-wise) independence condition. A topic can be binary (of the
form fp;:pg) or non-binary. For the preference agenda (Example 1), the Arrowian
relevance relation creates topics of the form fxRy;:xRy; yRx;:yRxg (for options
x; y 2 Q): the topic of xs and ys relative ranking.
An example of topic-wise independence is the variable-wise independence condi-
tion mentioned in the introduction. Consider a variant of Example 2, in which the
inter-variable constraints are exogenously imposed rather than under decision. So
the agenda is given by X+ = fV = v : V 2 V and v 2 Rge(V )g, and relevance by
R+(V = v) = fV = v0 : v0 2 Rge(V )g. To each variable V 2 V corresponds an
equivalence class: fV = v;:(V = v) : v 2 Rge(V )g, the topic of V s value. Judging
this topic boils down to specifying a value v 2 Rge(V ) of V (i.e. V = v is accepted
and all V = v0; v0 2 Rge(V )nfvg are rejected). So a judgment set A 2 J can be
identied with a function b assigning to each variable V 2 V a value v 2 Rge(V ).
Then J becomes a set B of such functions, and an aggregation rule F : J n ! J
becomes a function f : Bn ! B.17
Example 4: relevance as premisehood, and generalised premise-based
rules. If we interpret "rRp" as "r is a premise/reason/argument for (or against)
p", III is the condition that the aggregation rule be premise-based : that the collec-
tive judgment on any proposition p 2 X be determined by peoples reasons for their
judgments on p.
In principle, R could dene an arbitrarily complex premisehood structure over
a possibly complex agenda, generalising the classical premise-based procedure (PBP)
usually dened for simple agendas like agendas 1 and 2 in Figure 1. For agenda 1,
the classical PBP decides each "premise" a and b by a majority vote, and decides the
"conclusion" a ^ b by logical entailment from the decisions on a and b. This PBP is
III for the relevance ("premisehood") relation indicated in Figure 1:
R+(a) = fag, R+(b) = fbg, R+(a ^ b) = fa; bg. (3)
17Rubinstein and Fishburn (1986) analyse variable-wise independent aggregators f : Bn ! B,
assuming that there are only nitely many variables V , all with the same range, an algebraic eld
F (e.g. F = R). So B  FV. Their two main results establish correspondences between algebraic
properties of B, like being a hyperplane of the F -vector space FV, and algebraic properties of
"admissible" aggregators f : Bn ! B, like linearity or additivity. In practice, the hyperplane
condition on B seems restrictive: variables are interconnected by exactly one equation, and this
equation is linear. But note that linearity can sometimes be achieved by transforming the variables.
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Figure 1: Relevance ("premisehood") relations over four agendas. Arrows indicate
relevance. Agenda 1: X+ = fa; b; a ^ bg. Agenda 2: X+ = fa; a ! b; bg. Agenda 3:
X+ = fa; b; c; a ^ b; (a ^ b) ! c; a ! :cg. Agenda 4: X+ contains ten propositions
indicated by "".
For agenda 2 in Figure 1, the classical PBP takes majority votes on each "premise"
a and a ! b; if the resulting decisions logically constrain the "conclusion" b,18 b is
decided accordingly; otherwise b is (for instance) decided by a majority vote on b.
This PBP is III for relevance as given in Figure 1. Unlike in (3), the conclusion is
self-relevant: individual judgments on b may matter for deciding b.
In general, call p 2 X a root proposition if p has no premise other than p (and :p).
In (3), a and b are root propositions. Any root proposition p 2 X must be a premise to
itself: otherwise p would have no premises at all, violating "no underdetermination".19
So the collective judgment on any root proposition p is (by III) formed solely on the
basis of peoples judgments on p via some voting method majority voting if we
stick closely to the standard premise-based procedure while decisions on non-root
propositions may depend on external premises.
When interpreting R as a premisehood relation, additional requirements on R
may be appropriate. Surely, symmetry should not be required (unlike in Examples
1-3). Indeed, one might require that R is anti-symmetric on X+ (so that no distinct
propositions in X+ are premises to each other) or, more strongly, acyclic on X+ (so
that in X+ there is no cycle p1Rp2Rp3:::RpmRp1 where the pis are pairwise distinct
and m  2).
For some agendas X, specifying R is non-trivial: it is not obvious which proposi-
tions should count as reasons for/against which others. One might for instance draw
on the syntax of the propositions in X: if X+ = fa; a! b; bg, one might argue that
aRb because a! b 2 X, and not bRa because b! a =2 X. Finding objective criteria
for relevance would be an interesting research goal on its own.20
18Whether this is so may depend on whether "!" is a material or subjunctive implication.
19Unless p is a tautology or contradiction: then even the empty set settles p.
20For di¤erent purposes, relevance logicians (e.g. Parikh 1999) propose syntactic and other criteria
for when a proposition is relevant to another. Although this enterprise is controversial and its notion
of relevance may di¤er from ours, one might use such criteria in dening R.
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4 Justifying the "no underdetermination" condition
I now give a technical and a conceptual motivation for the "no underdetermination"
requirement on a relevance relation.
The technical reason is that "no underdetermination" is crucial for the existence
of non-degenerate III aggregation rules. The condition of judgment-set unanimity
preservation, whereby F (A; :::; A) = A for all unanimous proles (A; :::; A) in the
domain, is very mild (unlike the unrestricted propositionwise unanimity condition
mentioned in Section 7).
Theorem 1 Let R be an arbitrary binary relation on X. There exists a judgment-
set unanimity preserving III aggregation rule with universal domain if and only if R
satises "no underdetermination".
This defence of the "no underdetermination" condition needs no collective com-
pleteness or consistency condition, not even a non-dictatorship condition. So, given
underdetermination, not even rules with incomplete, or inconsistent, or dictatorial
outputs can satisfy the conditions.
Proof. First, suppose "no underdetermination" is violated for p 2 X. Then there
are sets A;A0 2 J such that p 2 A and p =2 A0 but A\R(p) = A0\R(p) (i.e. A and A0
disagree on p but agree on the relevant propositions). If we apply an III aggregation
rule F with universal domain to the two unanimous proles (A; :::; A) and (A0; :::; A0),
the resulting judgment sets F (A; :::; A) and F (A0; :::; A0) agree on p by III. So, as A
and A0 disagree on p, F (A; :::; A) 6= A or F (A0; :::; A0) 6= A0, violating judgment-set
unanimity preservation.
Second, suppose R satises "no underdetermination". I show that (for instance)
the unanimity rule with universal domain, given by F (A1; :::; An) = A1 \ ::: \ An,
satises III (it obviously also preserves judgment-set unanimity). Consider any p 2
X and (A1; :::; An); (A01; :::; A0n) 2 J n such that Ai \ R(p) = A0i \ R(p) for all i.
For all i, we have Ai \ fr;:r : r 2 R(p)g = A0i \ fr;:r : r 2 R(p)g. By "no
underdetermination", this set entails p or entails :p; in the rst case, p 2 Ai and
p 2 A0i, and in the second case p =2 Ai and p =2 A0i. So in any case p 2 Ai , p 2 A0i.
Hence p 2 \iAi , p 2 \iA0i, i.e. p 2 F (A1; :::; An), F (A01; :::; A0n), as desired. 
I now turn to a conceptual defence of "no underdetermination". This condition
can be violated for p 2 X only if p is self-irrelevant, a rather special assumption. I
can see only one (albeit prominent) case in which self-irrelevance has a clear moti-
vation: the case of premise-based collective decision making. Here the decision on
p 2 X should depend on peoples reasons (grounds) for accepting or rejecting p (as
in Examples 4). A persons reasons for accepting (rejecting) p can be viewed as a
set E of sentences that, if specied exhaustively, logically entails p (:p).21 But not
21 If the set of reasons E did not entail p, it wouldnt be exhaustive, i.e. some "reasons" have been
forgotten. For instance, if in inferring p from E the persons implicitly uses that (^e2Ee) ! p, i.e.
that p follows from the members of E, then (^e2Ee) ! p should be added as a reason to E. The
so-enlarged set of reasons now logically entails p. (In other situations, (^e2Ee)! p is not the missing
reason, i.e. E has to be enlarged di¤erently.)
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all sets of sentences E that entail p (:p) have to count as "sets of reasons" for ac-
cepting (rejecting) p; fpg might not count as a set of reasons for accepting p. For
instance, fag and fbg might count as the sets of reasons for accepting a disjunction
a _ b; and f:a;:bg might count as the only set of reasons for rejecting a _ b. Let
E(p) be the set of all sets of reasons for accepting or rejecting p. In the example,
E(a _ b) = ffag; fbg; f:a;:bgg. Plausibly, E(p) should contain su¢ ciently many sets
of reasons so that p cannot be accepted or rejected without any set of reasons E 2 E .
For instance, we cannot remove fag from E(a_ b): otherwise someone who accepts a
but not b would accept a_ b for no set of reasons E 2 E(a_ b). Given our assumption
of reason-based aggregation, every reason for or against p (i.e. every member of any
set of reasons E 2 E(p)) should be considered relevant to p: that is, [E2E(p)E  R(p)
(one might even argue that [E2E(p)E = R(p)). In this case, "no underdetermination"
holds.22
5 Possibility or impossibility?
Are there appealing III aggregation rules, and how do they look? General answers to
this question are harder to give than for proposition-wise independence. The reason
is that criteria for the (in)existence of (non-degenerate) III aggregation rules typi-
cally concern not just logical interconnections (as for proposition-wise independence)
but also relevance interconnections. More precisely, we need criteria on the inter-
play between logic and relevance. One such criterion is "no underdetermination",
which is (by Theorem 1) necessary and su¢ cient for a limited possibility: "limited"
because collective incompleteness is allowed (but collective consistency, agreement
preservation, and non-dictatorship could have been required in Theorem 1, as the
proof shows).
Below I derive one more possibility theorem with creteria for the possibility of
priory rules and four impossibility theorems. I deliberately sacrice some generality
(of the criteria) for simplicity and elegance.23
6 Priority rules
In this section, I adopt Example 4s interpretation of relevance as premisehood; and
I assume again that R is negation-invariant. Do there exist appealing premise-based
22What if some reasons e 2 [E2E(p)E are outside the agenda X (i.e. not part of the decision
problem), so that we cannot have [E2E(p)E  R(p)? One might either argue that such agendas are
simply misspecied (in the context of reason-based aggregation): if a_ b 2 X then X should include
a _ bs reasons. Or one might defend "no underdetermination" for such agendas: since "r 2 X is
relevant to p 2 X" more precisely means "the individualsjudgments on r are relevant information for
deciding p", if X excludes some of ps reasons then other propositions in X (perhaps p itself) become
relevant to p as peoples judgments on them are information on peoples non-available reasons. If
X = fa_ b;:(a_ b)g, the individualsjudgments on a_ b are relevant information for deciding a_ b
as they reect (partially) peoples non-available reasons; hence we have (a _ b)R(a _ b) (but not so
if X contains all reasons of a _ b).
23 I make no conjecture on the nature of minimal criteria for the (im)possibilities considered below,
except that such conditions would not have a unied or structured form but the form of disjunctions
of several cases. The reason is that the conditions must capture the joint and non-separable behaviour
of relevance and logical connections, which is left general and uncontrolled in the framework.
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(i.e. III) aggregation rules? I now introduce priority rules (generalising List 2004)
and give simple criteria for when they can be used.
An impossibility threat comes not only from logical interconnections between root
propositions (or other propositions), but also from transitivity violations of relevance
R. To see why, let p 2 X and suppose the premises of ps premises  call them
the "pre-premises"  are not premises of p. The decision on p is settled by the
decisions on ps premises (by "no underdetermination"), which in turn depend on
how people judge the pre-premises (by III). This forces the decision on p to be some
function f of how people judge the pre-premises. But by III the decision on p must
be a function of how people judge ps premises (not pre-premises). So f depends
on peoples pre-premise judgments only indirectly: only through peoples premise
judgments as entailed by their pre-premise judgments a strong restriction on f that
suggests that impossibility is looming.
It is debatable whether premisehood (more generally, relevance) is inherently a
transitive concept. If R is assumed transitive whether for conceptual reasons or
just to remove one impossibility source  interesting candidates for III aggregation
arise, as explained now. List (2004) introduces sequential priority rules in judgment
aggregation (generalising sequential rules in standard social choice theory). Here the
propositions of a (nite) agenda are put in a priority order p1; p2; ::: and decided
sequentially, where earlier decisions logically constrain later ones. As is easily seen,
such a rule is III if relevance is given by pjRpj0 , j  j0, a linear order on X+. I
now introduce similar rules relative to an arbitrary (possibly quite partial) relevance
relation. Informally, these rules decide the propositions in the order of relevance: each
p 2 X is decided by logical entailment from previously accepted relevant propositions
except if the latter propositions do not settle p, in which case p is decided via some
local decision method (e.g. via majority voting on p). Formally, a priority rule is
an aggregation rule F with universal domain such that there is for every proposition
p 2 X+ a ("local") aggregation rule Dp for the binary agenda fp;:pg (where Dp has
for this agenda universal domain and consistent and complete outcomes) with
F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg =
8<:
f~p 2 fp;:pg : F (A1; :::; An)\ if this set is
R(p)nfp;:pg ` ~pg non-empty
Dp(A1 \ fp;:pg; :::; An \ fp;:pg) otherwise
(4)
for all proles (A1; : : : ; An) 2 J n. So the pair p;:p is decided locally via Dp unless
the previous decisions F (A1; :::; An) \R(p)nfp;:pg are logically constraining (hence
"priority" to the previous decisions). In practice, rst every root proposition p 2 X+
and :p are decided by a local vote using Dp. Then every non-root proposition p 2 X+
to which only root propositions (and possibly p and :p) are relevant is decided: either
by entailment from the previous decisions on relevant root propositions or (if neither
p nor :p is entailed) by a local vote using Dp. And so on.
The local rule Dp may be chosen as the same rule for all p 2 X+ (e.g. majority
rule). Or Dp may vary: Dp might assign more weight to individuals with expertise
on p (e.g. to physicists if p is "Nuclear energy is safe"), or to individuals personally
a¤ected by the decision on p (e.g. to the citizens of towns X and Y if p is "A road
between X and Y should be built"). Such "expert rights" or "liberal rights" are
(unlike those in Dietrich and List 2004) conditional rights: they can be overruled
by previous decisions on relevant propositions. If the group can be partitioned into
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experts on di¤erent elds, and a proposition qs premises fall each into exactly one
of the elds, the decision on each premise p 2 X+ of q could be delegated entirely to
the experts on p, i.e. Dp uses only these expertsjudgments. This generalises Lists
(2005) distributed premise-based procedure. The premises from di¤erent elds might
form di¤erent subtrees preceding q.
Once we specify the family (Dp)p2X+ of local rules, the recursive formula (4)
denes a unique priority rule F(Dp)p2X+ := F , provided that relevance R is well-
founded on X+.24
The following theorem shows that, for transitive relevance, F(Dp)p2X+ (a) satis-
es III, and (b) generates consistent outcomes if certain logical independencies hold
within X. Result (a) is surprising in one respect: one might have expected that III
can be violated for non-self-relevant p 2 X due to the second case in (4). Let me mo-
tivate result (b). F(Dp)p2X+ could generate inconsistent outcomes if there are logical
dependencies between root propositions, or more generally between any propositions
pi 2 X; i 2 I, that are mutually irrelevant (i.e. for no distinct i; i0 2 I piRpi0). To see
why, notice that no pis precede other pis in the priority order (by irrelevance), whence
the decisions on the pis ignore each other. But even if the (mutually irrelevant) pis
are logical independent, inconsistent outcomes may still arise if there are logical in-
terconnections between the sets R(pi); i 2 I, as is easily imagined. This is why result
(b) requires certain logical independencies between the sets R(pi); i 2 I. To dene
these logical independencies, some terminology is needed. As usual, negation-closed
sets Ai; i 2 I; are called logically independent if [i2IBi is consistent for all consistent
sets Bi  Ai; i 2 I. Logical independence fails whenever Ai \Ai0 6= ; for some i 6= i0,
because the sets Bi and Bi0 can pick di¤erent members of a pair p;:p 2 Ai \ Ai0 .25
This "easy" way to render [i2IBi inconsistent is excluded in the following weaker
denition. I call negation-closed sets Ai; i 2 I; logically quasi-independent if [i2IBi
is consistent for all consistent sets Bi  Ai; i 2 I; such that any pair p;:p in an
intersection Ai \Ai0 (i 6= i0) has a member that is both in Bi and in Bi0 . (So Ai \Ai0
has the same intersection with Bi as with Bi0).
The theorem moreover requires relevance R to be vertically nite: there is no
innite sequence (pk)k=1;2;::: in X+ that is ascending (i.e. each pk is relevant to
and distinct from pk+1) or descending (i.e. each pk+1 is relevant to and distinct
from pk). In short, the network of inter-relevances is nowhere "innitely deep", but
possibly "innitely broad". This exclusion of "innite relevance chains" is a debatable
condition on the concept of relevance;26 without it the theorem would not hold.
24R is well-founded on X+ if every non-empty set S  X+ has an R-minimal element s (i.e. for no
r 2 Snfsg rRs); or, more intuitively, if there is no innite sequence (pk)k=1;2;::: in X+ such that each
pk+1 is relevant to and distinct from pk. The priority rule F  F(Dp)p2X+ uniquely exists because,
for every (A1; :::; An) 2 J n, F (A1; :::; An) is the union of the sets f(p) := F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg,
p 2 X+, where the function f is uniquely dened on X+ by recursion on R using the well-founded
recursion theorem (e.g. Fenstad 1980). If R is not well-founded on X+, there could exist no or many
priority rules with local rules (Dp)p2X+ .
25Unless p is a tautology or contradiction.
26For instance, one might argue (like Gärdenfors 2006) that every proposition can, in principle, be
explained in terms of more fundamental premises; this creates innite descending relevance chains.
On the other hand, realistic agendas might still be vertically nite: they might not include all
arbitrarily fundamental premises.
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Theorem 2 Let relevance R be transitive, vertically nite and negation-invariant.
(a) Every priority rule satises III.27
(b) Every priority rule generates consistent judgment sets if, for all mutually ir-
relevant propositions pi 2 X; i 2 I; the sets R(pi); i 2 I, are logically quasi-
independent.
The logical quasi-independence condition reduces to a logical independence con-
dition if no mutually irrelevant propositions share any relevant proposition  but
often the relevance (premisehood) relation is not of this special kind. Consider for
instance case 4 in Figure 1.28 Or consider a scientic board using a priority rule to
derive collective judgments on several scientic propositions: then mutually irrelevant
propositions, e.g. "Species X survives in Hawaii" and "Species Y survives in Aus-
tralia", might well share premises, e.g. "The ozone hole exceeds size Z" or general
biological or chemical hypotheses.
Proof. Let R and X be as specied. I leave it to the author to verify that Rs
vertical niteness implies (in fact, is equivalent to) the following: every non-empty set
S  X+ has an R-maximal element s (i.e. for no r 2 Snfsg sRr) and an R-minimal
element s (i.e. for no r 2 Snfsg rRs). In short:
max
R
S 6= ; and min
R
S 6= ;, for all ; 6= S  X+: (5)
In particular, R is well-founded on X+. Let F  F(Dp)p2X+ be a priority rule.
(a) To show III, I prove that all p 2 X+ have the following property: for all
(A1; :::; An); (A
0
1; :::; A
0
n) 2 J n, if Ai \R(p) = A0i \R(p) for all i then
F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg = F (A01; :::; A0n) \ fp;:pg: (6)
Suppose for a contradiction that the property fails for some p 2 X+. By (5)
there is a p 2 X+ that is R-minimal such that the property fails. So there are
(A1; :::; An); (A
0
1; :::; A
0
n) 2 J n with Ai \ R(p) = A0i \ R(p) for all i such that (6) is
false. By ps minimality property and Rs transitivity,
F (A1; :::; An) \R(p)nfp;:pg = F (A01; :::; A0n) \R(p)nfp;:pg: (7)
Let Y := f~p 2 fp;:pg : the set (7) entails ~pg.
Case 1 : Y 6= ;. Then, by the rst case in (4), F (A1; :::; An) \ fp;:pg = Y , and
for the same reason F (A01; :::; A0n) \ fp;:pg = Y . This implies (6), contradicting the
choice of p.
Case 2 : Y = ;. Then, by the second case in (4), F (A1; :::; An)\fp;:pg = Dp(A1\
fp;:pg; :::; An \ fp;:pg) and F (A01; :::; A0n) \ fp;:pg = Dp(A01 \ fp;:pg; :::; A0n \
fp;:pg). These two sets are distinct (as (6) is violated), and so for some i Ai \
fp;:pg 6= A0i \ fp;:pg. So, as Ai \ R(p) = A0i \ R(p), R(p) does not contain both
of p;:p, hence contains none of p;:p by negation-invariance. So the set (7) equals
F (A1; :::; An) \R(p), which contains a member of each pair r;:r 2 R(p), and hence
entails p or :p by "no underdetermination". This contradicts that Y = ;.
27This still holds if the vertical niteness condition is weakened to well-foundedness on X+.
28 If R is wished to be transitive, close the plotted inter-relevances under transitivity.
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(b) Assume the condition. For all p 2 X, put Rp := R(p) [ fp;:pg and Rp :=
R(p)nfp;:pg. Let (A1; :::; An) 2 J n. The (desired) consistency of A := F (A1; :::; An)
follows from the following claims.
Claim 1 : X = [p2maxRX+Rp; in particular, A = [p2maxRX+(A \Rp).
Claim 2 : for any mutually irrelevant propositions pi 2 X; i 2 I; the setsRpi ; i 2 I,
are logically quasi-independent; in particular, the sets Rp; p 2 maxRX+, are logically
quasi-independent.
Claim 3 : A \Rp is consistent for all p 2 X+ (hence for all p 2 maxRX+).
Proof of Claim 1. For a contradiction, suppose Xn [p2maxRX+ Rp 6= ;. Then,
by negation-invariance, X+n [p2maxRX+ Rp 6= ;. Hence by (5) there is a q 2
maxR
 
X+n [p2maxRX+ Rp

. By q =2 [p2maxRX+Rp, q =2 maxRX+. So q is rele-
vant to some q0 2 X+nfqg. We have q0 =2 X+n [p2maxRX+ Rp, as q is maximal in
X+n [p2maxRX+ Rp. So q0 2 [p2maxRX+Rp. Hence, as R is transitive, q is relevant
to some p 2 maxRX+, a contradiction as q =2 [p2maxRX+Rp.
Proof of Claim 2. Consider mutually irrelevant pi 2 X; i 2 I, and consistent sets
Bi  Rpi ; i 2 I; such that any pair p;:p in an intersection Rpi \ Rpi0 (i 6= i0) has
a member that is in Bi and in Bi0 . I show that [i2IBi is consistent. W.l.o.g. let
each Bi contain a member of each pair p;:p 2 Rpi (otherwise extend the Bis to
consistent sets Bi  Rpi with the property; the present proof shows the consistency
of [i2I Bi, hence of [i2IBi). As the sets R(pi); i 2 I; are logically quasi-independent,
(*) [i2I(Bi \R(pi)) is consistent. By "no underdetermination", (**) each Bi \R(pi)
entails a ~pi 2 fpi;:pig. Each Bi is either (Bi\R(pi))[f~pig or (Bi\R(~pi))[f:~pig; so,
as the latter set is inconsistent by (**) whereas Bi is consistent, Bi = (Bi \R(pi)) [
f~pig. Hence [i2IBi = [i2I((Bi \R(pi)) [ f~pig), which is consistent by (*) and (**).
Proof of Claim 3. Suppose the contrary: there is a p 2 X+ for which A \ Rp is
inconsistent. By (5), there is a p 2 X+ that is R-maximal subject to A \ Rp being
inconsistent. By an argument similar to that for Claim 1,
Rp = [q2maxR(X+\Rp)Rq; hence A \Rp = [q2maxR(X+\Rp)(A \Rq). (8)
By Claim 2, the sets Rq; q 2 maxR(X+\Rp), are logically quasi-independent. Hence,
as each A \ Rq in (8) is consistent (by the maximality of p), the set A \ Rp is
consistent. So, as A \ fp;:pg is related via (4) to A \Rp (= A \R(p)nfp;:pg), the
union (A\Rp)[(A\fp;:pg) = A\Rp is also consistent. This contradicts the choice
of p. 
7 A defensible (restricted) unanimity condition
It is natural to require (as in later theorems) a unanimity preservation condition. But
it would be against the relevance-based approach to require global unanimity preser-
vation, i.e. to require for all p 2 X that a unanimity for p implies social acceptance
of p. Indeed, a unanimity for p can be spurious: di¤erent individuals i can hold p
for di¤erent reasons, that is (in the relevance terminology) they may hold di¤erent
explanations Ei  fr;:r : rRpg of p.29 I will not require spurious unanimities to be
respected. This follows the frequent view that spurious unanimities have less norma-
tive force. It also follows our relevance-based approach, since propositions relevant
29On spurious unanimities, see for instance Mongin (2005-b) and Bradley (forthcoming).
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to p should not suddenly be treated as irrelevant if a unanimity accepts p. Instead,
I will impose a unanimity condition restricted to a xed set P  X of "privileged"
propositions:
Agreement Preservation. For every prole (A1; :::; An) in the domain and every
privileged proposition p 2 P, if p 2 Ai for all individuals i then p 2 F (A1; :::; An).
I assume that P is chosen such that a unanimity for a p 2 P cannot be spurious,
i.e. such that each p 2 P can be explained in just one way:30
P  fp 2 X : p has a single R-explanationg: (9)
By default (i.e. if P is not explicitly dened otherwise), I assume that (9) holds with a
"=". This maximal choice of P is often natural, though not necessary for the theorems
below. Another potentially natural choice is to include in P only propositions p 2 X
to which just p itself is relevant; so fpg is ps only explanation, i.e. p has no "external"
explanation.31
In the "classical" case that each p 2 X is just self-relevant, P by default equals
X,32 i.e. agreement preservation applies globally. So the "classical" relevance no-
tion renders not only III equivalent to standard independence but also agreement
preservation equivalent to standard (proposition-wise) unanimity preservation. If
X+ = fa; b; a ^ bg, with (negation-invariant) relevance given by (3), P may contain
a ^ b (which has a single explanation: fa; bg) but not :(a ^ b) (which has three ex-
planations: f:a; bg; fa;:bg; f:a;:bg). So a unanimity for :(a ^ b) can be spurious
and need not be respected.
Example 1 (continued) For the preference agenda, agreement preservation is equiv-
alent to the weak Pareto principle, in virtue of dening P as
P := f:xRy : x; y 2 Q; x 6= yg = fyPx : x; y 2 Q; x 6= yg, (10)
the set of strict ranking propositions yPx. I call (10) the Arrowian set of privileged
propositions. Note that (under the Arrowian relevance relation) each :xRy = yPx 2
P has indeed a single explanation: f:xRy; yRxg.
8 Semi-vetodictatorship and semi-dictatorship
Hereafter, we consider an III and agreement preserving aggregation rule F : J n ! J ,
relative to some xed relevance relationR and some xed set of privileged propositions
P. I give conditions (on logical and relevance links) that force F to be degenerate: a
(semi-)dictatorship or (semi-)vetodictatorship.
First, how should these degenerate rules be dened? The relevance-based frame-
work allows us to generalise the standard social-choice-theoretic denitions. Recall
30"Agreement" means "non-spurious unanimity". Hence the term "agreement preservation".
31 Interesting normative questions can be raised about the choice of P. For instance, Nehring (2005)
suggests in his analysis of the Pareto/unanimity condition that unanimities are normatively binding
if they reect "self-interested" judgments, or if they carry "epistemic priority".
32Unless X contains contradictions: these have no explanation, hence are not in P.
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that an (Arrowian) "dictator" is an individual who can socially enforce his strict
preferences between options, but not necessarily his indi¤erences. Similarly, a "ve-
todictator" can prevent ("veto") any strict preference, but not necessarily any in-
di¤erence. Put in our terminology, a dictator (vetodictator) can enforce (veto) any
privileged proposition of the preference agenda (given (10)). The following denitions
generalise this to arbitrary agendas.
Denition 1 An individual i is
(a) a dictator (respectively, semi-dictator) if, for every privileged proposition p 2 P,
we have p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all (A1; :::; An) 2 J n such that p 2 Ai (respec-
tively, such that p 2 Ai and p 62 Aj, j 6= i);
(b) a vetodictator (respectively, semi-vetodictator) if, for every privileged proposi-
tion p 2 P, i has a veto (respectively, semi-veto) on p, i.e. a judgment set
Ai 2 J not containing p such that p 62 F (A1; :::; An) for all Aj 2 J , j 6= i
(respectively, for all Aj 2 J , j 6= i, containing p).
In the standard models without a relevance relation, conditional entailment be-
tween propositions (rst used by Nehring and Puppe 2002/2005) has proven useful
to understand agendas. Roughly, p 2 X conditionally entails q 2 X if p together
with other propositions in X entails q (with a non-triviality condition on the choice
of "other" propositions). I cannot use conditional entailments here, as they reect
only logical links between propositions. Rather, I now dene constrained entailments,
a related notion that reects both logical and relevance links. It will turn out that
certain paths of constrained entailments lead to degenerate aggregation rules.33
Denition 2 For propositions p; q 2 X, if fpg [ Y ` q for a set Y  P consistent
with every explanation of p and with every explanation of :q, I say that p constrained
entails q (in virtue of Y ), and I write p ` q or p `Y q.34
The amount of constrained entailments in X is crucial for whether impossibili-
ties arise. Trivially, every unconditional entailment is also a constrained entailment
(namely in virtue of Y = ;). Intuitively, if there are more inter-relevances between
propositions, P becomes smaller, and propositions have more and larger explanations;
so the requirements on Y in constrained entailments become stronger; hence there
are fewer constrained entailments, and more room for possibilities of aggregation.
The preference agendaX (Example 1, with ArrowianR and P) displays many con-
strained entailments (hence impossibilities). For instance, xRy `fyPzg xPz (if x; y; z
are pairwise distinct options), as yPz is in P and is consistent with each explanation
33Nehring and Puppe (2002/2005) use paths of conditional entailment to dene their totally blocked
agendas. For such agendas, they obtain strong dictatorship by imposing that F satises proposition-
wise independence, an unrestricted unanimity condition, and a monotonicity condition. I impose
relevance-based conditions on F (III and agreement preservation); these conditions, like Arrows
conditions, imply less than strong dictatorship.
34Many alternative notions of constrained entailment turn out to be non-suitable: they do not
preserve interesting properties along paths of constrained entailments. The present denition is the
weakest one to preserve semi-winning coalitions. The requirement that Y  P allows one to apply
agreement preservation. In view of di¤erent results to those derived here, it might be fruitful to
impose additional requirements on Y , e.g. that Y be consistent also with explanations of :p and/or
of q.
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of xRy (fxRy; yRxg and fxRy;:yRxg) and the only explanation of :xPz = zRx. By
contrast, no non-trivial constrained entailments arise in our exampleX+ = fa; b; a^bg
with (negation-invariant) relevance given by (3): for instance, it is not the case that
a `f:(a^b)g :b since :(a ^ b) 62 P; and it is not the case that a `fbg a ^ b, as fbg is
inconsistent with the explanation fa;:bg of :(a ^ b). As a result, our impossibilities
will not apply to this agenda and cannot, as the premise-based procedure for odd
n (see Example 4) satises all conditions.
To obtain impossibility results, richness in constrained entailments is not su¢ -
cient. At least one constrained entailment p ` q must hold in a "truly" constrained
sense. By this I mean more than that p does not unconditionally entail q, i.e. more
than that p is consistent with :q: I mean that every explanation of p is consistent
with every explanation of :q.
Denition 3 For propositions p; q 2 X, p truly constrained entails q if p ` q and
moreover every explanation of p is consistent with every explanation of :q.
For instance, if relevance is an equivalence relation (as in Examples 1-3) that
partitions X into pairwise logically independent subagendas35 (as for the preference
agenda) then all constrained entailments across equivalence classes are truly con-
strained. Also, p ` q is truly constrained if p 6` q and moreover p and q are root
propositions (see Example 4).
Our impossibility results rest on the following path conditions.
Denition 4 (a) For propositions p; q 2 X, if X contains propositions p1; :::; pm
(m  2) with p = p1 ` p2 ` ::: ` pm = q, I write p `` q; if moreover one of
these constrained entailments is truly constrained, I write p ``true q.
(b) A set Z  X is pathlinked (inX) if p `` q for all p; q 2 Z, and truly pathlinked
(in X) if moreover p ``true q for some (hence all) p; q 2 Z.
While pathlinkedness forces to a limited form of neutral aggregation (see Lemma
3), true pathlinkedness forces to the following degenerate aggregation rules.
Theorem 3 If the set P of privileged propositions is inconsistent and truly path-
linked, there is a semi-vetodictator.
Theorem 4 If the set fp;:p : p 2 Pg of privileged or negated privileged propositions
is truly pathlinked, there is a semi-dictator.
In the present (and all later) theorems, the qualication "truly" can be dropped if
relevance is restricted to taking a form for which pathlinkedness (of the set in question)
implies true pathlinkedness, for instance if R is restricted to being an equivalence
relation that partitions X into logically independent subagendas.36
35That is, if X1; X2 are distinct subagendas, A[B is consistent for all consistent A  X1; B  X2.
36The argument for the latter is as follows. By Lemma 1, all constrained entailments within any
of the subagendas are unconditional entailments. This implies that the pathlinked set in question
contains propositions linked by a path containing a constrained entailment across subagendas. The
latter is truly constrained by an earlier remark.
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Under the conditions of Theorems 3 and 4, there may be more than one semi-
(veto)dictator, and moreover there need not exist any (veto)dictator.37
There are many applications. The preference agenda (Example 1) is discussed
later. If in Example 4 we let P be the set of root propositions, and if these root
propositions are interconnected in the sense of Theorem 4 (3), then some individual
is semi-(veto)decisive on all "fundamental issues"; and hence, premise-based or pri-
oritarian aggregation rules take a degenerate form (at least with respect to the local
decision methods Dp for root propositions p 2 X). Let me discuss Example 2 in more
detail.
Example 2 (continued) For many instances of this aggregation problem (of judging
values of and constraints between variables), the conditions of Theorems 3 and 4
hold, so that semi-(veto)dictatorships are the only solutions. To make this point, let
relevance be again given by (2), and let the privileged propositions be given by
P = fV = v : V 2 V&v 2 Rge(V )g [ fc;:c : c 2 Cg. (11)
Also, let jVj  2 (to make it interesting), and assume38
f:c : c 2 Cg 62 J . (12)
First, consider Theorem 3. Obviously, P is inconsistent, as C 6= ; by (12). Often,
P is also truly pathlinked. The latter could be shown by establishing that
(a) P1 := fV = v : V 2 V&v 2 Rge(V )g is truly pathlinked, and
(b) for all c 2 C there are p; q; r; s 2 P1 with c ` p, q ` c, :c ` r, s ` :c.
Part (a) might even hold in the sense of, for all V = v; V 0 = v0 2 P1 with
V 6= V 0, a truly constrained entailment V = v ` V 0 = v0 (rather than an indirect
path V = v `` V 0 = v0); indeed, there might be a set of constraints C  C and a
set of value assignments D  P1 such that V = v `C[D V 0 = v0 (hence, under the
constraints in C, the set of value assignments fV = vg [D implies that V 0 = v0).
Part (b) might hold for the following reasons. Consider a constraint c 2 C.
Plausibly, V = v `D :c for some V = v 2 P1 and D  P1; here, fV = vg[D is a set
of value assignments violating the constraint c. It is also plausible that c `D V = v
for some V = v 2 P1 and some D  P1; here, the value assignments in D imply,
under the constraint c, that V = v. Moreover, we could have V = v `D c for some
V = v 2 P1 and D  P1: this is so if the set of value assignments fV = vg [ D
37Suppose R(p) = fpg for all p 2 X (only self -relevance allowed), P = X (all propositions
privileged), and jXj <1. Then constrained entailment reduces to standard conditional entailment,
and pathlinkedness of X reduces to Nehring and Puppes (2002/2005) total blockedness condition
whereby there is a path of conditional entailments between any p; q 2 X. Dokow and Holzman
(2005) show that parity rules F , dened on J n by F (A1; :::; An) = fp 2 X : jfi 2 M : p 2 Aigj
is oddg for an odd-sized subgroup M  N , take values in J for certain agendas X that are totally
blocked (hence pathlinked, in fact truly pathlinked) and satisfy an algebraic condition. Such a parity
rule is also III and agreement preserving, and hence provides the required counterexample because
every i 2 M a semi-dictator and a semi-vetodictator, but not a dictator and not a vetodictator
(unless jM j = 1).
38Condition (12) requires that at least one constraint between variables holds, i.e. that the variables
are not totally independent from each other. This assumption is natural in cases where the question
is not whether but only how the variables a¤ect each other, as it is the case for macroeconomic
variables.
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violates all constraints in C except c, hence entails c by (12). Finally, we could have
:c ` ~C[D V = v for some V = v 2 P1 and D  P1, and some set ~C of negated
constraints; indeed, suppose f:cg [ ~C contains the negations of all except of one
constraint in C, hence entails the remaining constraint by (12); under this remaining
constraint, the value assignments in D could imply that V = v.
Now consider Theorem 4. The special form (11) of P in fact implies that the
conditions of Theorem 4 hold whenever those of Theorem 3 hold (hence in many
cases, as argued above). Specically, let P be truly pathlinked. To prove that also
fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly pathlinked, it su¢ ces to show that, for all V = v 2 P, there
is a p 2 P with :(V = v) `` p and p `` :(V = v). Consider any V = v 2 P, and
choose any p 2 C ( P). As P is pathlinked and by (11) contains :p and V = v, we
have :p `` V = v and V = v `` :p; hence (using Lemma 4 below) :(V = v) `` p
and p `` :(V = v), as desired.
I now derive lemmas that will help both prove the theorems and understand
constrained entailment. I rst give a su¢ cient condition for when a constrained
entailment reduces to an unconditional entailment.
Lemma 1 For all p; q 2 X with R(p)  R(:q) or R(:q)  R(p), p ` q if and only
if p ` q.
Proof. Let p; q be as specied. Obviously, p ` q implies p `; q. Suppose for a
contradiction that p ` q, say p `Y q, but p 6` q. Then fp;:qg is consistent. So there
is an B 2 J containing p and :q. Then
 the set B \ fr;:r : rRpg is an explanation of p;
 the set B \ fr;:r : rR:qg is an explanation of :q.
One of these two sets is a superset of the other one, as R(p)  R(:q) or R(:q) 
R(p); call this superset A. As p `Y q, A [ Y is consistent. So, as A ` p and A ` :q,
fp;:qg [ Y is consistent. It follows that fpg [ Y 6` q, in contradiction to p `Y q. 
The next fact helps in choosing the set Y in a constrained entailment.
Lemma 2 For all p; q 2 X, if p ` q then p `Y q for some set Y containing no
proposition relevant to p or to :q.
Proof. Let p; q 2 X, and assume p ` q, say p `Y q. The proof is done by showing
that p `Y n(R(p)[R(:q)) q. Suppose for a contradiction that not p `Y n(R(p)[R(:q)) q.
Then
(*) fp;:qg [ Y n(R(p) [R(:q)) is consistent.
I show that
(**) p ` p0 for all p0 2 Y \R(p) and :q ` q0 for all q0 2 Y \R(:q),
which together with (*) implies that fp;:qg [ Y is consistent, a contradiction
since p `Y q. Suppose for a contradiction that p0 2 Y \R(p) but p 6` p0. Then there
is a B 2 J containing p and :p0. The set A := B \ fr;:r : rRpg does not entail :p,
hence is an explanation of p (as R is a relevance relation). So A[ Y is consistent (as
p `Y q), a contradiction since A[Y contains both p0 and :p0. For analogous reasons,
for all q0 2 Y \X l it cannot be that :q 6` q0. 
Now I introduce notions of decisive and semi-decisive coalitions, and I show that
semi-decisiveness is preserved along paths of constrained entailments.
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Denition 5 A possibly empty coalition C  N is decisive (respectively, semi-
decisive) for p 2 X if its members have judgment sets Ai 2 J , i 2 C, containing
p, such that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC (respectively, for all Ai 2 J ,
i 2 NnC, not containing p).
While a decisive coalition for p can (by appropriate judgment sets) always socially
enforce p, a semi-decisive coalition can do so provided all other individuals reject p.
Let W(p) and C(p) be the sets of decisive and semi-decisive coalitions for p 2 X,
respectively.
Lemma 3 For all p; q 2 X, if p ` q then C(p)  C(q). In particular, if Z  X is
pathlinked, all p 2 Z have the same semi-decisive coalitions.39
Proof. Suppose p; q 2 X, and p ` q, say p `Y q, where by Lemma 2 w.l.o.g.
Y \ R(p) = Y \ R(:q) = ;. Let C 2 C(p). So there are sets Ai 2 J , i 2 C,
containing p, such that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, containing :p. By
Y s consistency with every explanation of p, it is possible to change each Ai, i 2 C,
into a set (still in J ) that contains every y 2 Y and has the same intersection with
R(p) as Ai; this change preserves the required properties, i.e. it preserves that p 2 Ai
for all i 2 C (as R is a relevance relation), and preserves that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for
all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, containing :p (by Y \ R(p) = ; and III). So we may assume
w.l.o.g. that Y  Ai for all i 2 C. Hence, by fpg [ Y ` q, all Ai, i 2 C, contain q.
To establish that C 2 C(q), I consider any sets Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, all containing
:q, and I show that q 2 F (A1; :::; An). We may assume w.l.o.g. that Y  Ai for all
i 2 NnC, by an argument like the one above (using that Y is consistent with any
explanation of :q,R is a relevance relation, Y \R(:q) = ;, and III). As f:qg[Y ` :p,
all Ai, i 2 NnC, contain :p. Hence p 2 F (A1; :::; An). Moreover, Y  F (A1; :::; An)
by Y  P. So, as fpg [ Y ` q, q 2 F (A1; :::; An), as desired. 
I now prove Theorems 3 and 4, after stating a last (obvious) lemma.
Lemma 4 (contraposition) For all p; q 2 X and all Y  P, p `Y q if and only if
:q `Y :p.
Proof of Theorem 3. Let P be inconsistent and truly pathlinked. I rst prepare
the proof by establishing three simple claims.
Claim 1. (i) The set C(p) is the same for all p 2 P; call it C0. (ii) The set C(:p)
is the same for all p 2 P.
Part (i) follows from Lemma 3. Part (ii) follows from it too because, by Lemma
4, f:p : p 2 Pg is like P pathlinked, q.e.d.
Claim 2. ; 62 C0 and N 2 C0.
By agreement preservation, N 2 C0. Suppose for a contradiction that ; 2 C0.
Consider any judgment set A 2 J . Then F (A; :::; A) contains all p 2 P, by N 2 C0
if p 2 A, and by ; 2 C0 if p 62 A. Hence F (A; :::; A) is inconsistent, a contradiction,
q.e.d.
39Constrained entailments preserve semi-decisiveness but usually not decisiveness.
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By Claim 2, there is a minimal coalition C in C0 (with respect to inclusion), and
C 6= ;. By C 6= ;, there is a j 2 C. Write C j := Cnfjg. As P is truly pathlinked,
there exist p 2 P and r; s 2 X such that p `` r, r ` s truly, and s `` p.
Claim 3. C(r) = C(s) = C0; hence C 2 C(r) and C j 62 C(s).
By Lemma 3, C(p)  C(r)  C(s)  C(p). So C(r) = C(s) = C(p) = C0, q.e.d.
Now let Y be such that r `Y s, where by Lemma 2 w.l.o.g. Y \R(r) = Y \R(:s) =
;. By C 2 C(r), there are judgment sets Ai 2 J , i 2 C, containing r, such that
r 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, not containing r. I assume w.l.o.g. that
for all i 2 C j , Y  Ai, hence (by frg [ Y ` s) s 2 Ai; (13)
which I may do by an argument like that in the proof of Lemma 3 (using that Y is
consistent with any explanation of q, R is a relevance relation, Y \ R(r) = ;, and
III). By (13) and as C j 62 C(s) (see Claim 3), there are sets Bi 2 J , i 2 NnC j ,
containing :s, such that, writing Bi := Ai for all i 2 C j ,
:s 2 F (B1; :::; Bn). (14)
I may w.l.o.g. modify the sets Bi, i 2 NnC j , into new sets in J as long as their
intersections with R(:s) stays the same (because the new sets then still contain :s
as R is a relevance relation, and still satisfy (14) by III). First, I modify the set Bi
for i = j: as r ` s truly, Bj \ft;:t : t 2 R(:s)g (an explanation of :s) is consistent
with any explanation of r, hence with Aj \ ft;:t : t 2 R(r)g, so that I may assume
that Aj \ ft;:t : t 2 R(r)g  Bj ; which implies that
Bi \R(r) = Ai \R(r) for all i 2 C. (15)
Second, I modify the sets Bi, i 2 NnC: I assume (using that Y \R(:s) = ; and Y s
consistency with any explanation of :s) that
for all i 2 NnC, Y  Bi, hence (as f:sg [ Y ` :r) :r 2 Bi. (16)
The denition of the sets Ai, i 2 C, and (16) imply, via (15) and III, that
r 2 F (B1; :::; Bn). (17)
By (14), (17), and the inconsistency of fr;:sg [ Y , the set Y is not a subset of
F (B1; :::; Bn). So there is a y 2 Y with y 62 F (B1; :::; Bn). We have fjg 2 C(:yg for
the following two reasons.
 Bj contains :y; otherwise y 2 Bi for all i 2 N , so that y 2 F (B1; :::; Bn) by
y 2 P.
 Consider any sets Ci 2 J , i 6= j, not containing :y, i.e. containing y. I show
that :y 2 A := F (C1; :::; Cj 1; Bj ; Cj+1; :::; Cn). For all i 6= j, Ci \ ft;:t :
t 2 R(y)g is consistent with y, hence is an explanation of y (as R satises
"no underdetermination"); for analogous reasons, Bi \ ft;:t : t 2 R(y)g is
an explanation of y. These two explanations must be identical by y 2 P. So
Ci\R(y) = Bi\R(y). Hence, by y 62 F (B1; :::; Bn) and III, y 62 A. So :y 2 A,
as desired.
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By fjg 2 C(:y) and Claim 1, fjg 2 C(:q) for all q 2 P. So j is a semi-
vetodictator. 
Proof of Theorem 4. Let fp;:p : p 2 Pg be truly pathlinked. I will reduce the
proof to that of Theorem 3. I start again with two simple claims.
Claim 1. The set C(q) is the same for all q 2 fp;:p : p 2 Pg; call it C0.
This follows immediately from Lemma 3, q.e.d.
Claim 2. ; 62 C0 and N 2 C0.
By agreement preservation, N 2 C(p) for all p 2 P; hence N 2 C0. This implies,
for all p 2 P, that ; 62 C(:p); hence ; 62 C0, q.e.d.
Now by an analogous argument to that in the proof of Theorem 3, but based this
time on the present Claims 1 and 2 rather than on the two rst claims in Theorem
3s proof, one can show that there exists an individual j such that fjg 2 C(:q) for all
q 2 P. So, by the present Claim 1 (which is stronger than the rst claim in Theorem
3s proof),
fjg 2 C(q) for all q 2 P: (18)
So j is a semi-dictator, for the following reason. Let q 2 P and let (A1; :::; An) 2 J n
be such that q 2 Aj and q 62 Ai, i 6= j. By (18) there is a set Bj 2 J containing
q such that q 2 F (B1; :::; Bn) for all Bi 2 J , i 6= j, not containing q. Since q has
only one explanation (by q 2 P), the two explanations Aj \ ft;:t : t 2 R(q)g and
Bj \ ft;:t : t 2 R(q)g are identical. So Aj \R(q) = Bj \R(q). Hence, using III and
the denition of Bj , q 2 F (A1; :::; An), as desired. 
9 Dictatorship and strong dictatorship
In fact, the semi-dictator of Theorem 4 is in many cases (including the preference
aggregation problem) a dictator, and in some cases even a strong dictator in the sense
of the following denition that generalises the classical notion of strong dictatorship
in social choice theory.
Denition 6 An individual i is a strong dictator if F (A1; :::; An) = Ai for all
(A1; :::; An) 2 J n.
So a strong dictator imposes his judgments on all rather than just privileged
propositions. I will give simple criteria for obtaining (weak or strong) dictatorship,
in terms of the following irreversibility property.
Denition 7 For p; q 2 X, p irreversibly constrained entails q if p `Y q for a set Y
for which fqg [ Y 6` p.
So a constrained entailment p ` q is irreversible if the constrained entailment is
not a "constrained equivalence", i.e. if p and q do not conditionally entail each other
(for at least one choice of Y ). If X is the preference agenda (with Arrowian R and
P), all constrained entailments between (distinct) propositions are irreversible. For
instance, xRy ` xRz is irreversible (for distinct options x; y; z), since xRy `fyPzg
xRz, where fxRz; yPzg 6` xRy.
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By the next result, the semi-dictatorship of Theorem 4 becomes a dictatorship
if we only slightly strengthen the pathlinkedness condition: in at least one path, at
least one constrained entailment should be irreversible.
Denition 8 (a) For propositions p; q 2 X, I write p ``irrev q if X contains propo-
sitions p1; :::; pm (m  2) with p = p1 ` p2 ` ::: ` pm = q, where at least one
of these constrained entailments is irreversible.
(b) A pathlinked set Z  X is irreversibly pathlinked (in X) if p ``irrev q for some
(hence all) p; q 2 Z.
Theorem 5 If the set fp;:p : p 2 Pg of privileged or negated privileged propositions
is truly and irreversibly pathlinked, some individual is a dictator.
As an application, I obtain the full Arrow theorem by proving that, if X is the
preference agenda, fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly and irreversibly pathlinked.40
Corollary 1 (Arrows Theorem) For the preference agenda (with Arrowian R and
P), some individual is a dictator.
Proof. Let X be the preference agenda, with R and P Arrowian. I show that
(i) P is pathlinked, and (ii) there are r; s 2 P with true and irreversible constrained
entailments r ` :s ` r. Then, by (i) and Lemma 4, f:p : p 2 Pg is (like P) path-
linked, which together with (ii) implies that fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly and irreversibly
pathlinked, as desired.
(ii): For any pairwise distinct options x; y; z 2 Q, we have xPy `fyPzg xRz
(= :zRx), and xRz `fzPyg xPy, in each case truly and irreversibly.
(i): Consider any xPy; x0Py0 2 P. I show that xPy `` x0Py0. The paths to
be constructed depend on whether x 2 fx0; y0g and whether y 2 fx0; y0g. As x 6= y
and x0 6= y0, the following list of cases is exhaustive. Case x 6= x0; y0&y 6= x0; y0:
xPy `fx0Px;yPy0g x0Py0. Case y = y0&x 6= x0; y0: xPy `fx0Pxg x0Py = x0Py0. Case
y = x0&x 6= x0; y0: xPy `fyPy0g xPy0 `fx0Pxg x0Py0. Case x = x0&y 6= y0; x0:
xPy `fyPy0g xPy0. Case x = y0&y 6= x0; y0: xPy `fx0Pxg x0Py `fyPxg x0Px. Case
x = x0&y = y0: xPy `; xPy. Case x = y0&y = x0: taking any z 2 Qnfx; yg,
xPy `fyPzg xPz `fyPxg yPz `fzPxg yPx. 
The proof of Theorem 5 uses two further lemmas. For any set S of coalitions
C  N , I dene S := fC 0  N : C  C 0 for some C 2 Sg.
Lemma 5 For all p; q 2 X,
(a) p ` q irreversibly if and only if :q ` :p irreversibly;
(b) if p ` q irreversibly then C(p)  C(q).
Proof. Let p; q 2 X. Part (a) follows from Lemma 4 and the fact that, for all
Y  P, fqg [ Y 6` p if and only if f:pg [ Y 6` :q.
40This property of fp;:p : p 2 Pg strengthens Nehrings (2003) nding that the preference agenda
is totally blocked, which gave him already a weaker version of Arrows theorem. Part (i) of our proof
is analogous to Nehrings proof and also to proofs for the strict preference agenda by Dietrich and
List (forthcoming-b) and Dokow and Holzman (2005).
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Regarding (b), suppose p ` q irreversibly, say p `Y q with fqg [ Y 6` p. We can
assume w.l.o.g. that Y \R(p) = Y \R(:q) = ;, since otherwise we could replace Y
by Y 0 := Y n(R(p) [ R(:q)), for which still p `Y 0 q (by the proof of Lemma 2) and
fqg[Y 0 6` p. To show C(p)  C(q), consider any C 0 2 C(p). So there is a C 2 C(p) with
C  C 0. Hence there are Ai 2 J , i 2 C, containing p, such that p 2 F (A1; :::; An)
for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC, containing :p. Like in earlier proofs, I may suppose w.l.o.g.
that, for all i 2 C, Y  Ai (using that Y is consistent with all explanations of p, R
is a relevance relation, III, and Y \ R(p) = ;); hence, by fpg [ Y ` q, q 2 Ai for all
i 2 C. Further, as f:p; qg [ Y is consistent (by fqg [ Y 6` p), there are sets Ai 2 J ,
i 2 C 0nC, such that f:p; qg [ Y  Ai for all i 2 C 0nC.
I have to show that q 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all Ai 2 J , i 2 NnC 0, containing
:q. Consider such sets Ai, i 2 NnC 0. Again, we may assume w.l.o.g. that for all
i 2 NnC 0, Y  Ai (as Y is consistent with all explanations of :q, R is a relevance
relation, III, and Y \ R(:q) = ;), which by f:qg [ Y ` :p implies that :p 2 Ai for
all i 2 NnC 0. In summary then,
Ai 
8<:
fp; qg [ Y for all i 2 C
f:p; qg [ Y for all i 2 C 0nC
f:p;:qg [ Y for all i 2 NnC 0.
So p 2 F (A1; :::; An) (by the choice of the sets Ai, i 2 C) and Y  F (A1; :::; An) (by
Y  P). Hence, as fpg [ Y ` q, q 2 F (A1; :::; An), as desired. 
In the following characterisation of decisive coalitions it is crucial that p 2 P.
Lemma 6 If p 2 P, W(p) = fC  N : all coalitions C 0  C are in C(p)g.
Proof. Let p 2 P and C  N . If C 2 W(p) then clearly all coalitions C 0  C are
in C(p). Conversely, suppose all coalitions C 0  C are in C(p). As C 2 C(p), there are
sets Ai, i 2 C, containing p, such that p 2 F (A1; :::; An) for all sets Ai, i 2 NnC, not
containing p. To show that C 2 W(p), consider any sets Ai, i 2 NnC (containing or
not containing p); I show that p 2 F (A1; :::; An). Let C 0 := C [ fi 2 NnC : p 2 Aig.
By C  C 0, C 0 2 C(p). So there are sets Bi, i 2 C 0, containing p, such that
p 2 F (B1; :::; Bn) for all sets Bi, i 2 NnC 0, not containing p. As p has a single
explanation, we have for all i 2 C 0 Ai \ fr;:r : r 2 R(p)g = Bi \ fr;:r : r 2 R(p)g,
hence Ai \R(p) = Bi \R(p). So, by III and the denition of the sets Bi, i 2 C 0, and
since p 62 Ai for all i 2 NnC 0, p 2 F (A1; :::; An), as desired. 
Proof of Theorem 5. Let fp;:p : p 2 Pg be truly and irreversibly pathlinked. By
Theorem 4, there is a semi-dictator i. I show that i is a dictator.
Claim. For all q 2 fp;:p : p 2 Pg, C(q) contains all coalitions containing i.
Consider any q 2 fq;:q : q 2 Pg and any coalition C  N containing i. By true
pathlinkedness there exist p 2 P and r; s 2 X such that p `` r ` s `` q, where
r ` s is a truly constrained entailment. By fig 2 C(p) and Lemma 3, fig 2 C(r). So,
by Lemma 5(b), C 2 C(s). Hence, by Lemma 3, C 2 C(q), q.e.d.
By this claim and Lemma 6, fig 2 W(p) for all p 2 P. This implies that i is a
dictator, by an argument similar to the one that completed the proof of Theorem 4.

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Finally, for what agendas do we even obtain strong dictatorship? Surely not for
the preference agenda, as it is well-known that Arrows conditions only imply weak
dictatorship.41
Trivially, if all propositions are privileged, every dictatorship is strong:
Corollary 2 If P = X, and X is truly and irreversibly pathlinked, some individual
is a strong dictator.
But the assumption P = X removes nearly all generality: agreement preservation
becomes global unanimity preservation, and the relevance relation is forced to give
each p 2 X a single explanation. However, strong dictatorship follows under a much
less restrictive condition than P = X. Call p 2 X logically equivalent to A  X if A
entails p and p entails all q 2 A (i.e. intuitively, if p is equivalent to the conjunction
of all q 2 A). For instance, a ^ b is equivalent to fa; bg (where a; b; a ^ b 2 X).
Theorem 6 If fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly and irreversibly pathlinked and each proposi-
tion in X is logically equivalent to a set of negated privileged propositions A  f:p :
p 2 Pg, some individual is a strong dictator.
Proof. Let the assumptions hold. By Theorem 5, there is a dictator i. To
show that i is a strong dictator, I consider any (A1; :::; An) 2 J n, and I show that
Ai = F (A1; :::; An). Obviously, it su¢ ces to show that F (A1; :::; An)  Ai. Suppose
q 2 F (A1; :::; An). By assumption, q is logically equivalent to some A  f:p : p 2 Pg.
For all :p 2 A, we have :p 2 F (A1; :::; An) (by q ` :p), hence p 62 F (A1; :::; An),
and so p 62 Ai (as p 2 P and i is a dictator), implying that :p 2 Ai. This shows that
A  Ai. So q 2 Ai (since A ` q), as desired. 
The preference agenda X, which has not strongly dictatorial solutions, indeed
violates the extra condition in Theorem 6: some propositions in X (namely precisely
the privileged propositions xPy) are not logically equivalent to any set of negated
privileged propositions xRy.
Example 2 (continued) As argued earlier, fp;:p : p 2 Pg is truly pathlinked in
many instances of this aggregation problem. The other conditions in Theorem 6 also
often hold, so that strong dictatorship follows. The reasons are simple.
First, X is often rich in irreversible constrained entailments. For instance, if X
contains value assignments V = 3 and W = 3 and the constraint W > V , then
V = 3 ` :(W = 3) irreversibly, since V = 3 `fW>V g :(W = 3) but f:(W =
3);W > V g 6` V = 3; or, if X contains a constraint c that is strictly stronger than
another constraint c0 2 C, then c ` c irreversibly, since c `; c0 but fc0g[; = fc0g 6` c.
Second, if P is again given by (11), each proposition q 2 X is indeed logically
equivalent to a set of negated privileged propositions A  f:p : p 2 Pg: if q has the
form V = v, one should take A = f:(V = v0) : v0 2 Rge(V )nfvgg; otherwise q has
the form :p with p 2 P, and so one may take A = fqg.
41Lexicographic dictatorships satisfy all conditions but are only weak dictatorships.
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10 Conclusion
The impossibility ndings might be interpreted as showing how relevance R should
not be specied. Indeed, in order to enable non-degenerate III aggregation rules, R
must display su¢ ciently many inter-relevances. But such richness in inter-relevances
may imply that collective decisions have to be made in a "holistic" manner: many
semantically unrelated decisions must be bundled and decided simultaneously. Two
propositions, say one on tra¢ c regulations and one on diplomatic relations with Ar-
gentina, have to be treated simultaneously if the relevance relation (specied suf-
ciently richly to enable non-degenerate aggregation rules) displays some possibly
indirect link between the two.42 Large and semantically disparate decision problems
are a hard challenge in practice.
As I began to discuss in Section 3, several types of relevance relations, hence
informational constraints, are of interest to aggregation theory. Which III aggregation
rules are there if relevance is, for instance, transitive? Or asymmetric? Or well-
founded? In addition to such questions, it is worth exploring further the premise-
based and prioritarian approaches. If a distance-based approach compatible with
the informational constraint III could be developed, the theories of belief merging
and judgment aggregation would meet. Developing di¤erent types of III aggregation
procedures should go hand in hand with developing objective criteria for when to
consider a proposition as relevant to another, i.e. for which informational restriction
to impose. This second research goal has a normative dimension. Reaching both
goals would enable us to give concrete recommendations for practical group decision-
making.
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